INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the qualification of remote warfare as a form of armed conflict under international humanitarian law. It does so first by considering how armed conflict is defined and how the concept has evolved since the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It then focuses on three modes of attack that are commonly associated with remote warfare: the use of remotely piloted vehicles, cyber operations, and autonomous weapon systems. Bearing in mind the challenges that each of these present to the applicability of the law, it will be argued that the concept of armed conflict needs to be interpreted in terms consistent with the object and purpose of international humanitarian law, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
DEFINING 'ARMED CONFLICT'
The most fundamental prerequisite for the applicability of international humanitarian law is the existence of armed conflict. Without armed conflict, this body of law is deprived of the material field for its application. Accordingly, the characterization of the situation as one of armed conflict is of pivotal importance for the protection provided by international humanitarian law. In this section, the concept of armed conflict will be analysed, providing the basis for the qualification of remote warfare under international humanitarian law.
The applicability of international humanitarian law is determined by the terms of Articles 2 and 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common
Article 2 states that the Conventions will apply to 'all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them'. Common Article 3 sets out the applicability of a 'minimum' of provisions '[i] n the case of armed conflict not of an international character'. Together, common Articles 2 and 3 define the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to situations of international and noninternational armed conflict. The use of the term 'armed conflict' in both provisions was significant. It was the first time that term had been used to define the applicability of a treaty. As noted by the ICRC Commentary on the first Geneva Convention:
It fills the gap left in the earlier Conventions, and deprives the belligerents of the pretexts they might in theory invoke for evasion of their obligations. There is no longer any need for a formal declaration of war, or for recognition of the state of war, as preliminaries to the application of the Convention. The Convention becomes applicable as from the actual opening of hostilities. The existence of armed conflict between two or more Contracting Parties brings it automatically into operation.
It remains to ascertain what is meant by 'armed conflict'. The substitution of this much more general expression for the word 'war' was deliberate. One may argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of 'war'. A State can always pretend, when it commits a hostile act against another State, that it is not making war, but merely engaging in a police action, or acting in legitimate self-defence. The expression 'armed conflict' makes such arguments less easy.
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In this way, the use of 'armed conflict' in common Articles 2 and 3 avoided issues surrounding the legal characterization of 'war'. 2 The applicability of the law of war 1 (ICRC 1952) 32. was expanded. With subsequent developments in treaty law, and changes in the nature of armed conflict, the meaning associated with the term has continued to evolve. One of the most significant turning points in this context was the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case. In its Decision on the Defence Motion for
Jean S Pictet (ed), Commentary I Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber defined the concept of armed conflict as follows:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.
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This definition of armed conflict filled a lacuna that had previously existed in the law. As the President has said many times, we are at war with al-Qa'ida … Our ongoing armed conflict with al-Qa'ida stems from our rightrecognized under international law-to self defense. This appears to suggest no predetermined limit to the duration of the campaign.
With regard to the geographic scope of the campaign, it is generally accepted that international humanitarian law applies to the theatre of hostilities, to places where prisoners of war are detained and to areas under the control of a party to the conflict.
However, as Brennan mentioned in his statement, the United States does not view its campaign as being confined to 'hot' battlefields like the ones in Afghanistan. The campaign crosses many national boundaries: Besides Afghanistan, attacks have been reported in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Iraq, Mali and Libya.
When attacks using drones are undertaken in the context of a pre-existing local armed conflict-whether international or non-international in nature-it is undoubtable that international humanitarian law would apply to these operations. The situation is less clear where there is no pre-existing armed conflict and no consent for the use of UAVs against suspects terrorists from the authorities of the state in which the attack takes place. According to the US position, the 'armed conflict' is one that is global; it is one that follows wherever the use of lethal force is authorized by the US government, the exercise of which is justified on a continuing basis of self-defense.
In addition to targeting 'al-Qa'ida and its associated forces', the approach adopted by the United States has also been extended to the Islamic State (ISIS). In It is for the Americans to defend or describe their own definition. We would consider on a case-by-case basis, where there is an armed conflict between government authorities and various organised armed groups, and we would look at various factors case-by-case … such as the duration or intensity of the fighting. The UK's support for this use of lethal force abroad by the US demonstrates the urgent need for the Government to clarify its understanding of the legal basis for the UK's policy. The US policy, in short, is that it is in a global armed conflict with ISIL/Da'esh, as it has been since 9/11 with al-Qaida, which entitles it to use lethal force against it 'wherever they appear.' On this view, the Law of War applies to any such use of force against ISIL/Da'esh, wherever they may be. This is not, however, the position of the UK Government. setting precedents that could be used by other states or entities in the fairly near future, it is vital that the existing international legal framework for the deployment of such a weapons system be consistently and strictly complied with. States need to be as clear as possible about the legal bases invoked when deploying armed drones.
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For the use of drones to be lawful as a form of remote warfare, the context must be one of armed conflict. The absence of clarity concerning the characterization of situations as such is detrimental not only to applicable legal regimes but also for the maintenance of international peace and security. The concern has also been raised that 'the use of armed drones for killings in remote places with little or no risk to one's own forces raises the issue of lowering the threshold to the point of trivialising such interventions and of accountability for the actual outcome of each strike'.
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Considering the continued growth in the deployment of armed drones, and the frequently transnational nature of their use, it is arguable that more attention would be useful at an international level to strengthen compliance with the law. Christof Heyns, There is an urgent need for the international community to gain greater consensus on the interpretation of the constraints that international law in all its manifestations places on the use of drones. This is important not only because of the implications for those who currently find themselves on the receiving end of drones, but in order to keep a viable and strong system of international security intact. A central component of such a security system is the rule of law. Drones should follow the law, not the other way around.
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As the context for the use of armed drones determines the applicability of international humanitarian law, so it is with other forms of remote warfare. The section that follows examines cyber operations and explores issues surrounding the characterization of such as a form of armed conflict.
Cyber Operations
In with such rules is, however, thwarted by the secretive nature of cyber operations, the lack of transparency under which attacks are undertaken and the absence of a treaty specifically concerned with the regulation of cyberwarfare. Solis comments that:
Defining many aspects of cyber warfare is problematic because there is no multinational treaty directly dealing with cyber warfare. That is because, so far, many aspects of cyber war are not agreed upon. The consequence severity. Death, injury, damage or destruction clearly qualify an action as armed conflict, while inconvenience and irritation do not. But beyond that, the law is uncertain.') law of war, as well as customary international law, lacks cyber-specific norms, and state practice interpreting applicable norms is slow to evolve. 
Autonomous Weapon Systems
While the use of drones and cyber operations present their own distinct challenges to the conceptual basis for the characterization of armed conflict, the use of autonomous weapon systems has been described as a potential 'paradigm shift'. 44. It was of common understanding that, as with all weapon systems, the rules of IHL are fully applicable to LAWS. However, many delegations questioned whether weapons systems that select and attack targets autonomously would be able to comply with these rules.
45. A number of delegations argued that human judgment was necessary in order to assess the fundamental principles of proportionality, distinction and precautions in attack. For this reason, it was recognized that a human operator should always be involved in the application of force. Many delegations questioned if it would be possible to programme a legal assessment into a machine prior to its deployment. Given the rapidly changing circumstances in a conflict, it would be difficult to conceive of a LAWS distinguishing between lawful and unlawful targets. For example, it was unclear as to how LAWS could be programmed to recognize the surrender of a combatant or take feasible precautions in attack. Additionally, it was noted that a potential target may alter its behaviour in order to deliberately confuse assessments made by a machine.
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The report of the CCW expert meeting states that: 'Most delegations maintained that machines are simply incapable of executing legal judgements as required by IHL, especially in complex and cluttered environments typical in conflict scenarios.' 37 In addition to the absence of meaningful human control in the selection and attack of targets, significant issues of accountability are raised by the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems. Given the technology's state of development, it is currently not clear how the doctrine of command responsibility would apply to attacks undertaken using such weapons. This was also reflected in discussions at the CCW expert meeting:
Accountability was highlighted as a central element of IHL. Doubts were raised over whether the required standards of accountability and responsibility for the use of force and its effects could be upheld with the deployment of LAWS. In the case of an incident involving LAWS, it was uncertain as to who would be held accountable within the chain of command or responsibility, such as the commander, programmer, or operator. As a result, it was argued by some that legal grey zones could emerge, which in turn might be deliberately exploited and foster impunity. Others noted that this would not be the case, but that evidentiary issues may arise. It was proposed that there should be a requirement for LAWS to keep records of their operations. Other delegations responded that, if LAWS can be used in compliance with IHL, there would not be an accountability gap as any issues could be addressed under international criminal law and the law of State responsibility. ('Based on current and foreseeable technology, there are serious doubts about the ability of autonomous weapon systems to comply with IHL in all but the narrowest of scenarios and the simplest of environments. In this respect, it seems evident that overall human control over the selection of targets and use of force against them will continue to be required.') 38 CCW, Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts (n 36), para 52.
In light of the above, it was recommended that further consideration be given to the question of 'legal and political responsibility and accountability'.
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With regard to the applicability of international humanitarian law, concerns have been expressed that autonomous weapon systems may lower the threshold required for the qualification of a situation as one of armed conflict. 40 In addition, the absence of human participation poses a challenge as to how the parties to armed conflicts are to be characterized. When two sides engage in hostilities through the use of autonomous weapons systems and there is no direct human participation in the conflict from either side, does the law of armed conflict apply? In other words, is it possible to qualify a situation as one of armed conflict if none of the parties directly engaged in hostilities are human beings? The answer to this question is arguably best addressed by considering rules relating to the interpretation of international humanitarian law under customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The section that follows will explore how such rules could be potentially applied to autonomous weapons systems and to the other forms of remote warfare discussed above.
RESPONDING TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF ARMED CONFLICT
Hersch Lauterpacht commented in the 1950s that 'if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law'. 41 If the law of armed conflict has a vanishing point in the 21st century, it is arguably that of remote warfare.
The challenges posed by drones, cyber operations and autonomous weapons systems to the applicability of international humanitarian law go well beyond the conditions of warfare contemplated by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. On account of this, it is essential to consider rules that govern the interpretation of such treaties.
As mentioned above, the concepts of international and non-international armed conflict are linked to Articles 2 and 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. If international humanitarian law is to be deemed applicable to the different forms of remote warfare, it must be interpreted in terms consistent with the scope of these provisions. In this context, reference must be made to the terms of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states the following general rule of interpretation:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. [T]he International Court of Justice has deduced the object and purpose of a treaty from a number of highly disparate elements, taken individually or in combination:
− From its title;
− From its preamble;
− From an article placed at the beginning of the treaty that 'must be regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which the other treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied';
− From an article of the treaty that demonstrates 'the major concern of each contracting party' when it concluded the treaty;
− From the preparatory works on the treaty; and − From its overall framework. The starting point of any legal analysis on armed drones should be existing international law, in particular the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life. Modifying well-established rules of international law to accommodate the use of drones might have the unintended long-term consequence of weakening those rules. The existing legal framework was sufficient and did not need to be adapted to the use of drones, rather, it was the use of armed drones that must comply with international law.
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With regard to cyber warfare, the issue of characterization is complicated by the lack of consensus on how it is to be defined, problems of attribution and the absence of an international agreement clarifying the applicability of international humanitarian law 51 UN News Centre, 'UN human rights expert questions targeted killings and use of lethal force', (n 22). Cyber operations are a classic example of an attempt to fit things into the laws of armed conflict where in fact they should not be addressed through these laws at all. The default classification of cyber operations, on one view, is that they amount to an armed conflict and so the laws of armed conflict apply. However, it is also argued that since such operations do not adhere to the definition of attack under international humanitarian law, the restrictions on attacks, imposed by the principle of distinction, do not apply … One of the main challenges is to identify … which type of operation should be addressed under the laws of armed conflict and which type should not.
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In deciding which operations should be addressed by international humanitarian law, the characterization of each situation should be guided by the object and purpose of of armed conflict as a concept of international humanitarian law, consistent with its object and purpose.
Likewise with regard to autonomous weapon systems, this is an area where consensus on the basis for characterization is urgently required. According to William Boothby:
Future developments in weapons technologies are likely to enable attacks to be prosecuted remotely, automatically, potentially autonomously and, in either case, perhaps also anonymously. Some such developments cause one to wonder whether notions of remote attack will take us to a point at which there is a degree of dissociation between armed forces personnel and the hostilities for which they are responsible. Taken to an extreme, perhaps hostilities in which machines target one another autonomously and/or automatically would cease to be 'warfare' as that term has traditionally been understood.
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Accordingly, it is conceivable that autonomous weapon systems could be deployed in hostilities against other autonomous weapon systems. In the absence of human participation, could such a situation be characterized as one of armed conflict? As with other forms of remote warfare, assessments would need to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis. Even if autonomous weapon systems were to be deployed in a context where human casualties did not arise directly from the conduct of hostilities, it should be recognized that victims also result from displacement and the destruction of property, including the damage to works and installations containing dangerous forces, such as nuclear power stations. The question of qualification for application of international humanitarian law would necessarily need to take into account the function that law serves not only in relation to the protection of the human person but also with regard to the protection of cultural property and the natural environment. To respond to the challenges posed by remote warfare, it is necessary to be mindful of how the law has evolved and the importance of preserving the integrity of its interpretation. In order for this to be realized the concept of armed conflict must be interpreted in terms consistent with the object and purpose of international humanitarian law, that is, the protection of victims. As noted by Elizabeth Wilmshurst, '[t] he protection of victims of war depends upon the proper application of international humanitarian law and that depends upon the appropriate classification'.
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Indeed:
Legal complexities about the distinctions between categories of hostilities should not be allowed to get in the way of the objectives of international humanitarian law, either by making the application of the legal protections more difficult or by rendering the law so complex that none but the most sophisticated of armed forces can realistically apply it.
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In order to further the protection provided by the law, newer forms of warfareincluding the use of armed drones, autonomous weapons system and cyber operations-must be accommodated in the concept of armed conflict. The basis for doing so should be consistent with the existing framework that governs the conduct of hostilities, irrespective of how hostilities are characterized. 
